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Abstract (100 - 120 words) 31 
Conservation conflicts represent complex multi-layered problems which are 32 
challenging to study. We explore the utility of theoretical, experimental and 33 
constructivist approaches to games to help understand and manage these 34 
challenges. We show how these approaches can help develop theory, understand 35 
patterns in conflict and highlight potentially effective management solutions. The 36 
choice of approach should be guided by the research question and whether the 37 
focus is on testing hypotheses, predicting behaviour or engaging stakeholders. 38 
Games provide an exciting opportunity to help unravel the complexity in conflicts, 39 
whilst researchers need an awareness of the limitations and ethical constraints 40 
involved. Given the opportunities, this field will benefit from greater investment and 41 
development. 42 
 43 
 44 
 45 
 46 
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 48 
The conflict challenge 49 
 50 
Conflicts are widespread within conservation and are damaging to both conservation 51 
interests and to the livelihoods and well-being of people involved [1,2]. Such 52 
conflicts are often complex, seemingly intractable and open-ended “wicked” 53 
problems [3–5]. Whilst superficially they may appear to be about lions attacking 54 
livestock, or the impact of superabundant geese in an agricultural landscape, in 55 
reality they involve complex layers of multiple stakeholders with different interests, 56 
values, goals, and life experiences in different political, cultural and historical 57 
settings [2,6–9]. The complexity of conflicts challenges our ability to tease out critical 58 
elements, understand the dynamics of conflict and stakeholder behaviour, design 59 
effective interventions, understand how to promote engagement and build possible 60 
solutions. Traditional ecological approaches to studying such issues have often failed 61 
to meet this challenge and in some cases have led to ineffective interventions which 62 
at worst can exacerbate existing problems [10].  63 
 64 
Games  offer a potentially powerful means to disentangle this complexity and help 65 
understand conflicts and their management. In everyday usage, a game is a 66 
competitive activity defined by its rules, and is generally played for fun. However, a 67 
more formal definition is offered by game theory, which regards a game as a model 68 
of a strategic situation in which the outcome of an individual’s action also depends 69 
on the actions chosen by others[11,12]. Viewed in this way, games provide both a 70 
framework for formal analysis of conflicts and form the basis of a set of powerful 71 
research tools which can be used to clarify the key elements of a conflict, investigate 72 
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the beliefs and behaviour of the participants, examine the effects of changes to the 73 
system and engage stakeholders in productive discussion. 74 
 75 
Various approaches to studying conflict and co-operation based on games have been 76 
developed in fields related to conservation (e.g. natural resource management [13, 77 
15,1617]; cooperation over the provision of public goods [14]), but the games 78 
literature can seem a bit overwhelming: the characteristics, strengths and weakness 79 
of alternative approaches are not always clearly understood; they have different 80 
philosophical underpinnings; and the terminology used to describe them can be 81 
confusing for non-specialists. As a result, they have not yet been widely applied to 82 
the study of conservation conflicts. 83 
 84 
We cannot hope to be comprehensive in reviewing the diversity of games here, so 85 
instead we focus on describing and differentiating between theoretical, 86 
experimental and constructivist approaches to using games that are relevant to 87 
those working in conservation. We explore how each one may contribute to our 88 
understanding and management of conflict. We start by briefly describing and 89 
illustrating the approaches with examples. We then consider the types of problems 90 
that emerge in conflict situations and how they may be addressed by the different   91 
approaches to games. We then examine an on-going conflict to illustrate how games 92 
may help to understand and manage it. Lastly, we consider some of the general 93 
limitations and ethical issues involved in using games in conflicts and propose 94 
promising directions for future work. 95 
 96 
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Approaches to games 97 
Theoretical games are characterised by a formal mathematical analysis or simulation 98 
of players, behaviours, outcomes and rules (see Box 1). They are useful for 99 
understanding the nature of conflicts and identifying novel solutions to real-world 100 
situations of strategic conflict. For example, a typical situation concerns the joint 101 
goals of wildlife conservation and food production where protected animals have a 102 
negative impact on farmers. Such a scenario could be simplified to consider two 103 
possible strategies - for parties to cooperate, or to defect as when farmers illegally 104 
hunt or conservationists exclude local people from the benefits of tourism income. 105 
Game-theoretic analyses of such simple scenarios often seek analytic solutions [13]. 106 
For example, in the “tragedy of the commons” scenario [14], individuals seek to 107 
maximise their own payoffs, leading to long term reductions in benefits for everyone 108 
(all wild animals killed and no income from tourism). Because this problem is defined 109 
by strategic interactions among rational players, a game-theoretic perspective can 110 
be used to better understand such conflicts and potentially offer novel solutions for 111 
promoting cooperation and sustainability [15,16], such as having an agreed level of 112 
wild animals, agriculture and income from tourism.  113 
 114 
In the related fields of common pool resources, land and water management and 115 
fisheries, theoretical games have included more complex dynamic simulations, the 116 
coupling of social-ecological systems and the uncertainty that is inherent in these 117 
systems. The inclusion of both natural resource dynamics and human behaviour has 118 
improved our conceptual understanding of conflict situations [17–19], broken down 119 
the complexity of decision-making for individual stakeholder objectives [20], allowed 120 
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us to make qualitative or quantitative predictions of behaviour or other system 121 
outcomes [21] and unified case studies through common theory [15,22]. Theoretical 122 
games typically assume that simulated players follow a particular set of behaviour 123 
patterns, such as being rational decision-makers, providing a baseline for comparison 124 
with real-world behaviour [12]. However, behaviours deviating from classical 125 
economic theory are also possible [23,24]. For a detailed discussion of the use of 126 
game-theoretic approaches in conservation see [18].  127 
Strengths: Useful to probe theoretical understanding of a situation, examine the 128 
logical conclusions of assumptions about a conflict, and make predictions about the 129 
effects of changing aspects of a system. 130 
Weaknesses: Necessarily simplified; they cut humans out of the loop, so the 131 
complexity of real people in the process is lost. 132 
 133 
Experimental games are used to investigate participant behaviour in controlled 134 
strategic situations, in either the laboratory or the field [25]. Experiments based on 135 
games provide powerful tools for testing theoretical predictions about individual and 136 
group behaviour [26] and for quantifying behavioural traits, such as levels of trust 137 
and trustworthiness [27] and preferences for risk or fairness [28]. In this way, 138 
experimental games enable the investigation of responses to conservation 139 
interventions within the context of complex social dilemmas without the need to 140 
rely on theoretical assumptions, or expensive full implementation studies. They are 141 
well suited to investigations of possible conflict management strategies, enabling 142 
researchers to study their relative effectiveness in a controlled setting prior to 143 
implementation (See Box 2). This approach is particularly useful when participants in 144 
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a game are themselves stakeholders in the conflict the game seeks to model since 145 
behaviour has been shown to vary with factors such as cultural and educational 146 
background and familiarity with the situation being represented [29]. The application 147 
of experimental game approaches with real stakeholders thus increases the 148 
likelihood that results of experiments are applicable to real world resources, 149 
institutions, and people [26]. 150 
Strengths: Useful for testing theories and practical interventions that are 151 
difficult/expensive to test at 'reality scale' and to quantify behavioural traits. 152 
Weaknesses: Necessarily simplified, although not as much as theoretical games; 153 
Design and implementation requires attention to detail so that a truly fair 154 
comparison is made among treatments. Outcomes can be sensitive to small changes 155 
in the experimental design. 156 
 157 
The constructivist approach requires games to be designed and used in iterative 158 
processes to understand conflict situations and to help stakeholders come up with 159 
solutions [30]. These games can be card games, board games or role-playing games, 160 
and they are used to foster dialogue and build trust among stakeholders [31]. As for 161 
experimental games, constructivism integrates players inside the game – bringing in 162 
their needs, desires, beliefs and intentions, allowing their behaviour in the game to 163 
represent differences in knowledge and values. The difference from other 164 
approaches, however, is that here the players are given freedom to explore a range 165 
of possible outcomes in strategic situations, so they can reframe the problem and 166 
the game, and create new options not initially contemplated by the research team 167 
[30](Box 3). As a result the capacity to learn and anticipate are integral to the 168 
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behaviour observed within a game [32]. In conservation conflict contexts, these 169 
games often have a multi-agent system structure, with a landscape, resources, and 170 
stakeholders, interactions within and among these components, and explicit 171 
representation given to the cognitive capacities of the agents [33]. This approach is 172 
exemplified by the work of the Companion Modelling community 173 
(www.commod.org). 174 
Strengths: Flexible enough to allow for a wide range of human behaviour; useful to 175 
establish dialogue, help people understand different viewpoints and agree a shared 176 
understanding of a conflict. 177 
Weaknesses: Documentation, analysis, replication and synthesis are all challenging. 178 
 179 
How can games be used to address questions about conflicts?  180 
A number of issues that emerge from research on conflicts are pertinent to games 181 
[2] (Table 1). First, there is a need to find generalities from the numerous case 182 
studies and build relevant theory. For example, we might want to develop 183 
hypotheses for how cooperation can develop in dynamic ecosystems that typically 184 
have a high degree of uncertainty and significant fluctuations in resources [34]. 185 
When mapping conflicts, there is a need to explore the underlying patterns and 186 
behaviour of conflicts – how they emerge and how they change over time, and when 187 
they switch from conflict to cooperation [35,36]. In addition, understanding conflict 188 
relies on mapping the underlying stakeholder values, emotions, interests and 189 
positions and how these aspects affect behaviour in conflicts [37–41]. Moving into 190 
conflict management, a widespread issue lies in understanding the impact of 191 
different types of interventions on stakeholder behaviour and on the level of 192 
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conflict. Such interventions can include both specific technical measures such as 193 
compensation schemes or lethal control, or interventions focused on trust and 194 
relationships, dialogue processes, governance and institutions [42–50]. Lastly, a 195 
critical issue lies in the importance of dialogue and engagement in promoting 196 
listening, understanding and the development of solutions among stakeholders.  197 
 198 
All three approaches to using games can provide useful insight into each of these 199 
areas of conflict research (Table 1), and the choice between them should be guided 200 
by the specific research question and context in which they will be applied. However, 201 
some approaches tend to suit certain objectives. For example, experimental 202 
approaches are well suited to exploring how an intervention might alter stakeholder 203 
behaviour in a conflict, whilst constructivist approaches are useful when exploring 204 
solutions with stakeholders. It is also worth pointing out that synergies may arise by 205 
using combinations of games, such as experimental and constructivist approaches 206 
[76]. 207 
Table 1: Suggestions about how different approaches to games could be used to 208 
address objectives relevant to understanding and managing conservation conflicts. 209 
These suggestions are illustrative in nature and are not intended to be exhaustive or 210 
mutually exclusive. Each suggestion is accompanied by a reference to a study where 211 
this type of approach to games was used to address comparable objectives in a 212 
related field. 213 
 214 
 Approach  
Objective  Theoretical  
e.g. game theoretic modelling 
on computer 
Experimental  
e.g. common pool resource and 
public goods games in lab and 
field 
Constructivist  
e.g. role playing games and 
companion modelling in lab and 
field  
Develop theory 
about 
conservation 
conflict in a 
changing 
environment 
Relevance of approach: 
To explore the logical 
consequences of theories of 
conflict 
 
Comparable example: 
Relevance of approach: 
To test assumptions about 
behaviour in conflicts and look 
for generalities 
 
Comparable example: 
Relevance of approach: 
To elicit the insights of 
stakeholders about the nature 
of conflicts 
 
Comparable example: 
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Exploring whether social 
ostracism can promote 
cooperation and sustainability 
in fisheries harvesting, 
assuming rational agents  
[19] (Box 1).  
Testing how environmental 
stochasticity and trust affect 
cooperation to mitigate 
climate-change [53].  
 
Eliciting stakeholders’ reported 
behavioural strategies in a 
natural resource management 
and conservation setting [31]. 
Understand how 
conflicts emerge, 
evolve and 
resolve 
Relevance of approach: 
To examine the conditions 
under which conflicts are likely 
and suggest how they might be 
changed to encourage 
cooperation. 
 
Comparable example: 
Analysing the history of 
environmental conflict, 
identifying the structure and 
actions (e.g. enforcement) of 
the conflict and predicting 
possible solutions [54].  
Relevance of approach: 
To test the role of specific 
factors in promoting 
cooperation or conflict  
 
 
 
Comparable example: 
Testing the effects of fear and  
environmental uncertainty on 
co-operation between nations 
with respect to climate change 
action [56]. 
Relevance of approach: 
To support dialogue and shared 
learning to co-identify the roots 
of and solutions to conflict 
 
 
 
Comparable example: 
Building a shared 
representation of farmers’ 
interactions with a protected 
area to allow for the 
negotiation of uncertainties and 
risks [57]. 
Understand how 
values, interests 
and positions 
affect stakeholder 
behaviour 
Relevance of approach: 
To predict conflict from values 
and norms 
 
 
Comparable example:  
Explaining outputs from 
different types of theoretic 
games in relation to how 
equity, reciprocity and 
competitive behaviour affect 
co-operation [58]. 
 
Relevance of approach: 
To test how individual and 
institutional characteristics 
affect behaviour  
 
Comparable example:   
Investigating how personal 
norms and other individual 
scale variable in the context of  
village-scale influence 
cooperative behaviour [61]. 
Relevance of approach: 
To facilitate understanding of 
behaviour and social learning. 
 
 
Comparable example:   
Revealing the processes leading 
to overgrazing. The game 
facilitated social learning and 
game facilitated instrumental 
and served as a platform for 
sharing views, knowledge, and 
perceptions [63]  
Identify how 
interventions 
affect stakeholder 
behaviour and 
conflict 
Relevance of approach: 
To predict behavioural 
responses to different 
interventions 
 
Comparable example:  
Investigating effects of 
payments and sanctions on 
poaching and importance of 
individual-level heterogeneity 
and strategic decision-making 
in design of interventions. [67]. 
 
Relevance of approach: 
To test behavioural responses 
to different interventions 
 
 
Comparable example:  
Assessing three alternative 
payment schemes for 
promoting sustainable forest 
resource use and the effect of 
communication, leadership, and 
external advice on their 
effectiveness [72]. 
Relevance of approach: 
To explore behavioural 
responses to different 
interventions with stakeholders 
 
Comparable example:  
Revealing the effect of policy 
change on stakeholder 
behaviour in coffee plantations 
(Box 3) 
Promote 
engagement 
amongst 
stakeholders to 
understand 
conflicts and 
develop solutions. 
Relevance of approach: 
To co-construct theoretical 
models to explore solutions 
 
Comparable example:   
Combining theoretical and 
role-playing games to simulate 
fishery management and 
explore effectiveness of 
management options [73]. 
Relevance of approach: 
To promote dialogue and test 
solutions 
 
Comparable example:   
Using experimental games as a 
development tool to teach 
communities about incentives 
and strategic interaction [74]  
Relevance of approach: 
To promote and support co-
management  
 
Comparable example:   
Bringing local communities and 
protected area managers 
together to co-design role-
playing game and collaborate to 
produce effective management 
plans.[57]. 
 215 
To further guide the choice of approaches, it is useful to ask whether the main aim of 216 
the game is to test specific hypotheses, predict behaviour or to engage stakeholders 217 
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(Figure 1). Experimental approaches best fit the aim of testing hypotheses, and 218 
constructivist approaches are best suited if the aim is engagement. If the aim is to 219 
predict future behaviour, then the most appropriate approach will depend on two 220 
things: first, whether or not there is a reasonable model of the players’ decision-221 
making process, and second, whether the main interest is in the system or the 222 
stakeholders. If there is knowledge of how people choose between a small set of 223 
actions then theoretical games will be most useful for predicting the behaviour of 224 
both systems and stakeholders. However, if there is no reasonable model of 225 
decision-making, then constructivist approaches are likely to be most helpful at 226 
predicting system behaviour, and experimental games are likely to be most helpful 227 
at predicting stakeholder behaviour.  228 
 229 
Figure 1. Decision tree highlighting how different approaches to games (theoretical, 230 
experimental and constructivist) fit the different objectives outlined in table 1, and 231 
whether the aim of the research is focused on testing hypotheses, predicting future 232 
behaviour or stakeholder engagement. 233 
 234 
 235 
 236 
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Approaching a live conflict – geese in agricultural landscapes  237 
To illustrate the utility of alternative approaches, we consider how games could be 238 
used to illuminate different facets of the conflict over rapidly increasing geese 239 
populations (Box 4). Most populations of geese in Europe (14 of 17 populations of 7 240 
species) have grown from threatened to super-abundant over the last 60 years [77]. 241 
These geese often graze in intensively managed agricultural fields leading to conflict 242 
with farming objectives [78,79]. Management strategies and policies have failed to 243 
adapt to this increasing problem, causing frustration among stakeholders, and 244 
reinforcing polarisation and conflicts [80]. Games can provide insight into the 245 
understanding and management of this conflict in several ways.  246 
 247 
General limitations & ethics  248 
Whilst games have enormous potential to provide insight, they are not a panacea. 249 
One of the main limitations of all the games is that, as for all models of reality, they 250 
require complex situations to be simplified. It is hard to choose which aspects of a 251 
situation can be safely ignored in order to develop an appropriate game. In addition, 252 
games may give the illusion of representing real-world outcomes, yet they cannot 253 
predict with certainty what will happen when the stakes are real. A particular 254 
concern about the external validity arises in situations where the payoffs used in a 255 
game are considerably lower than in real-life [26,81]. Similarly, there are issues of 256 
internal validity - are the decisions being made by game participants the same as 257 
those a researcher believes are being made? [81]. These questions need to be 258 
considered throughout the process of developing, implementing and interpreting a 259 
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game. Debriefing session after experimental/constructivist games with the 260 
participants are valuable in helping to provide insight into their behaviour. 261 
 262 
While a game can seem innocuous fun, games with stakeholders can raise serious 263 
ethical issues: from framing and game design through implementation and 264 
publishing the results. For example, at the design stage, it is easy for researchers to 265 
plan a game in such a way that their preferred solution is the winning strategy, 266 
turning the outcome of the game into a foregone conclusion. To avoid this pitfall, the 267 
community of Companion Modelling has drafted a charter of conduct [30]. In 268 
addition, early and thorough testing are essential to address questions such as, "are 269 
participants able to understand the game and participate meaningfully given their 270 
level of education and cultural background?", or "are we in a position to understand 271 
what participants take from the game?". Game designers need to consider how to 272 
capture and represent sensitive behaviours, such as corruption, poaching or 273 
reprisals. Designs and tools are available to avoid revealing individual information to 274 
other players, or even to the research team [71]. Stakeholders may also question 275 
whether games are serious enough to warrant the interest of busy professionals 276 
with a reputation to lose [32].  277 
 278 
Payments involving cash or other tangible goods are sometimes used in games 279 
[71,82]. These approaches need to be thought through before implementation. 280 
Payments linked to individual performance within games are supposed to give 281 
players an incentive to focus harder, but also incentivise acting more selfishly, 282 
potentially undermining the basis of collaboration [83]. In certain contexts, this 283 
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would improve understanding of the system. In others, it could be detrimental, 284 
particularly if the incentives are trivial compared to the costs that stakeholders incur 285 
in real life.  286 
 287 
During certain games, the role of the participants will evolve, and researchers need 288 
to reflect on how much power they are willing to give to participants and how to 289 
deal with the power asymmetries among stakeholders and between stakeholders 290 
and the research team [84]. In fact, even playing a game may affect the system, so 291 
researchers need to exercise reflexivity to be aware of any potential unintended 292 
outcomes of such interventions [85]. It is worth noting that although games with 293 
participants can spark conflicts or add fuel to existing ones, conflicts are rarely 294 
created by the interactions in the games but are inherent to the situation being 295 
explored. Games simply bring these processes to light so that the conflict can be 296 
managed instead of being suppressed by the power structure of the status quo [86]. 297 
Nevertheless, they require careful facilitation to manage expectations and deal with 298 
emerging issues.  299 
 300 
The ethical considerations of publishing games that involve stakeholders are also 301 
important. Participants should be informed how data will be used, who will have 302 
access to it, and in what form, particularly if it is identifiable to a particular player. As 303 
with other empirical approaches to investigating sensitive behaviour, anonymising 304 
individual behaviour may not, in itself, be sufficient to ensure that game participants 305 
are protected from harm [87].  306 
 307 
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Future Directions 308 
Games offer exciting opportunities to help guide the understanding and 309 
management of conflicts over biodiversity and conservation. This field of conflict 310 
research is focused on case studies with limited efforts to draw out the generalities 311 
[88]. Games have the potential to help find and explore the generalities, such as the 312 
consistent findings in ultimatum games of concern for others – as opposed to the 313 
pure self-interest that is often assumed [11], and consider how they might fit in 314 
different contexts. We consider a number of outstanding questions in Table 2.  315 
 316 
Concluding remarks 317 
Conflicts are ubiquitous, persistent and damaging. Their complexity and critical 318 
human dimensions mean that they are challenging to study and manage. Games 319 
have the potential to address these problems and provide genuine insight into a 320 
wide range of issues around how we understand and manage conflicts. Moreover, 321 
games also have the potential to be fun. There are different types of games available 322 
to address different questions and situations – from theoretical games to ones 323 
involving the active participation of stakeholders. Given their potential to help 324 
develop theory, understand patterns in conflict and highlight potentially effective 325 
management solutions, we suggest this field is ripe for development, given proper 326 
awareness of the limitations and ethical constraints. 327 
 328 
  329 
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Box 1 An example of a theoretical game developed to address a fisheries conflict and 330 
the role of cooperation. 331 
 332 
 333 
 334 
 335 
 336 
 337 
 338 
 339 
 340 
 341 
 342 
Tilman et al. [19] recently investigated conflict within a social-ecological fishery 343 
system by constructing a mathematical model of the fishery as a common-pool 344 
resource system. Fishers can increase their own profits by maximising their catch, 345 
but the individual gain achieved by doing so contributes to long-term depletion of 346 
total fisheries stock. The authors looked at this case study using game theory, 347 
defining a 'socially-optimal' fishing strategy that could be enforced by allowing 348 
fishers to ostracise one another when over-harvesting occurs. In the mathematical 349 
model, fishers could either join a cooperative or they could harvest independently 350 
which increased profit, but came at the cost of being ostracised by the cooperative. 351 
Further, the punitive power of the cooperative increased with its size, and 352 
ostracising independent harvesters also incurred a cost to the fishers in the 353 
cooperative. 354 
 355 
Tilman et al. [19] modelled the dynamics of fish biomass and the fraction of fishers 356 
that joined the cooperative. Fishers were assumed to be rational agents who joined 357 
or not based on whichever choice maximised their profit. They demonstrated the 358 
conceptually general, counter-intuitive result that social ostracism can promote 359 
cooperation and ultimately sustainability when individuals within a cooperative 360 
harvest at a rate that is higher than what would otherwise be optimal for maximising 361 
the long-term rate of resource harvest overall. This is because a higher harvest rate 362 
for individuals within a cooperative can discourage independent harvesters from 363 
invading, and ultimately leads to more sustainable long-term harvests. Hence, this 364 
theoretical approach suggested a novel, generally applicable, way to address 365 
conservation conflict. 366 
 367 
 368 
 369 
 370 
 371 
 372 
 373 
 374 
 375 
 376 
Figure 1 from [19] showing that 
cooperation and ultimately sustainability is 
best promoted at a higher total effort of 
harvest (Nash EQ) than would be optimal 
(Social Optimum) for maximising long-term 
profit (dashed lines). Figure reproduced 
with permission from the journal. 
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 377 
Box 2. An example of an experimental game developed to predict the outcomes of 378 
incentive-based interventions on illegal resource use in Cambodia.  379 
 380 
 381 
 382 
 383 
 384 
 385 
 386 
 387 
 388 
 389 
 390 
In Cambodia, illegal resource use inside protected areas is common, with high rates 391 
of hunting and land clearance in particular leading to conflict between local people 392 
and conservation authorities. One solution that has been developed to mitigate this 393 
conflict is the introduction of incentive-based interventions to promote compliance 394 
with land use and resource access zones. To evaluate the potential behavioural 395 
impact of these interventions, Travers et al. [70] used an experimental game 396 
adapted from the common-pool resource game developed by Ostrom et al. [15]. To 397 
aid understanding, the game was framed around the harvesting of fish from a pond 398 
within the protected area. Each participant was given the option of harvesting fish 399 
from this pond or choosing to leave fish unharvested for future use. Payoffs were set 400 
such that harvested fish were worth considerably more to the individual harvesting 401 
than if they had been left in the pond. However, the collective value of fish left in the 402 
pond was greater than the payoff an individual received from harvesting. This set up 403 
a social dilemma in which the optimum strategy for players who wanted to maximise 404 
their own payoff was to harvest as many fish as they could, whereas the social 405 
optimum was to leave all fish in the pond.  406 
 407 
A number of alternative management strategies were investigated, including fines if 408 
participants were caught harvesting too many fish and individual or collective 409 
rewards for keeping harvests within predefined thresholds. The most effective 410 
interventions at reducing fish harvest were those that encouraged participants to 411 
self-organise, through the use of incentives that were conditional on group 412 
behaviour or allocated to individuals by the group. Although the treatments 413 
considered in the game were stylised versions of those applied in reality, the findings 414 
provided valuable insight into the features of incentive initiatives predicted to have 415 
the greatest impact on encouraging sustainable use of resources and mitigating 416 
conflict between local people and conservation authorities. This has led to increased 417 
efforts to promote the development of local institutions and the provision of 418 
collective incentives to local communities.  419 
 420 
 421 
 422 
 423 
Photos by H. Travers 
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 424 
 425 
Box 3. An example of a role-playing game to explore the likely influence of policy 426 
change on an agro-forestry system in India  427 
 428 
 429 
The landscape of Kodagu, in India’s Western Ghats is a mosaic of rice fields, forest 430 
fragments and coffee farms. Coffee is produced under complex, multi-storeyed 431 
agroforestry systems, but farmers are replacing a diverse, native canopy cover with 432 
the fast growing, introduced Silver Oak Grevillea robusta [89,90]. Whereas the 433 
harvesting of native species is controlled, silver oak can be logged and traded [91]. 434 
For years, coffee farmers and their representatives have been demanding full 435 
ownership rights over trees on their land [89]. These demands have been opposed 436 
by the Forest Department for fear of the environmental impact. Farmer 437 
representatives have denied that the granting of rights would result in a loss of tree 438 
cover or conversion [92]. This polarized debate has led to a long-lasting standoff. 439 
 440 
A role-playing game was developed with academics, representatives of the Central 441 
Coffee Board of India, local conservation organisations, private coffee trading 442 
companies, and community leaders in eight separate workshops across the district. 443 
Through workshops and interviews, the game was co-constructed and explored two 444 
scenarios. The business as usual scenario had rules for selling native trees mimicking 445 
the restrictions in place. The tree rights scenario saw these restrictions lifted. These 446 
game sessions were recorded and used as a basis for discussion. 447 
 448 
The results suggested that farmers would increase their income were they to receive 449 
full rights. But we also observed that in such situations they decided to hasten, 450 
rather than reverse, the conversion to Silver Oak. This strategy was contrary to 451 
expectations that farmers would retain native forest, but instead, the faster rotation 452 
of Silver Oak trumped the multiple values of the native trees.  453 
 454 
The lessons from this role-play game were bittersweet. The game revealed system 455 
components and processes that had been identified in none of the policy narratives 456 
of the concerned parties. These represented hidden pitfalls that would have plunged 457 
the system into a non-desired state had the current policy change been 458 
implemented as initially designed. However, these lessons could not be transferred 459 
to the policy process, in part because the findings undermined the initial position of 460 
our main partners, the coffee farmers themselves. 461 
 462 
  463 
Photos by C.A.Garcia 
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BOX 4. Examples of how three approaches to games could be used in a current 464 
conflict over geese impacts on agricultural systems in Sweden. 465 
 466 
Background. Increasing numbers of 467 
protected geese in Europe are causing 468 
impacts on agricultural production [77]. In 469 
Sweden, the government pays 470 
compensation and supports the scaring of 471 
most goose species, but as populations 472 
increase, farmers are asking for more 473 
lethal control.  474 
 475 
 476 
Theoretical game example. Objective – predict the impact of management 477 
strategies on collaborations and goose populations. First, map the time series of 478 
goose numbers, management actions and players’ interactions over time, to develop 479 
a modelling framework within which game theory can be applied. Then simulate the 480 
actions and players’ interactions using mathematical or computational techniques to 481 
find actions that reduce conflict. Such a game could enable predictions as to which 482 
actions will lead to collaboration and a sustainable goose population under changing 483 
conditions of governmental budget changes.  484 
 485 
Experimental game example. Objective – test a hypothesis that farmers are more 486 
likely to cooperate in a goose management scheme, which uses a lethal rather than 487 
non-lethal control method. The game setting would be an idealised landscape in 488 
which geese move among farms and damage crops. Players would be farmers who 489 
choose between lethal or non-lethal measures using a cash endowment they receive 490 
in each round. These measures would only be effective if the sum of investments 491 
reached a predetermined threshold. If too few invest, no protection would be 492 
achieved. Such an approach would allow researchers to test players' willingness to 493 
participate in different measures and examine the effect of collective discussions on 494 
individual decision-making. Post-game debriefing sessions would provide a greater 495 
understanding of the factors influencing farmer behaviour.  496 
 497 
Constructivist games example. Objective – engage stakeholders to explore lethal vs. 498 
non-lethal interventions under changing economic resources. This game would be 499 
played over a co-developed idealised landscape. Stakeholders would build and play 500 
the game to explore the strategies they would employ under lethal and non-lethal 501 
action scenarios, interacting with each other and the resources in the landscape. The 502 
game would allow the compatibility and sustainability of actions over space and time 503 
to be assessed. The design and gaming process and post-game reflections 504 
would facilitate a shared understanding of the conflict among participants, enabling 505 
an explorations of the outcomes and stakeholder acceptance for measures and 506 
the development of innovative interventions. 507 
 508 
 509 
  510 
Photo by Johan Månsson 
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